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The present study investigated the consequences of different forms of emotion regulation. Eighty nine
healthy participants viewed a distressing video of the aftermath of road trafﬁc accidents under either
suppression (of both felt and expressed affect), acceptance, or no-regulation control instructions and the
immediate and longer-term consequences on emotion, mood, and memory were examined. Suppression
(relative to control) led to reduced subjective experience of fear when viewing the video, but did not
alter electrodermal (EDA) or heart rate (HR) response. Subsequently, suppression led to a less marked
subjective emotional reaction to positive but not negative emotional images, reduced free recall memory
of the video, and a greater likelihood of experiencing zero intrusions of the video’s content. Acceptance
(relative to control) had no impact when viewing the video, was associated with a less marked increase
in EDA activity in the 5 min period immediately after viewing the video, a more marked HR deceleration
and EDA response to both positive and negative images, and elevated negative affect at one week follow-
up. These ﬁndings suggest, contrary to the current clinical zeitgeist, that emotion suppression can
successfully lead to an ongoing down-regulation of emotion and memory, whereas acceptance may
elevate subsequent emotionality.
 2009 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.Introduction
Central to well-being is the ability to regulate emotions, deﬁned
as the automatic and intentional means by which people inﬂuence
the emotions they have, when they are experienced, and how they
are experienced and expressed (Gross, 1989). Effective emotion
regulation enables the individual to cope adaptively with a wide
range of environmental contingencies but when it goes awry it is
increasingly recognised it may have negative emotional and
cognitive consequences, potentially becoming a development or
maintenance factor in mental or physical ill health (e.g. Berenbaum,
Raghavan, Le, Vernon, & Gomez, 2003; Gross & Levenson, 1997;
Pennebaker, 1997).
It is therefore important to better understand the positive and
negative consequences of different emotion regulation strategies.
In this regard, there is ongoing controversy in the ﬁeld about the
consequences of deliberate attempts to suppress emotion, deﬁned
here as effortful attempts to down-regulate the internal experience
and external expression of unwanted (usually negative) affect.5; fax: þ44 1223 359062.
(B.D. Dunn), danielle.billotti
c.uk (T. Dalgleish).
 license.Contrasting predictions emerge from the clinical and normative
literature about the consequences of such emotion suppression.The ‘maladaptive suppression hypothesis’
On the one hand, the current clinical zeitgeist is to argue that
chronic attempts to intentionally reduce emotion via suppression
are generally unhelpful, whereas adopting an accepting, non-
judgmental stance towards emotions is helpful. So called ‘third-
wave’ interventions increasingly advocate the use of mindfulness
and/or acceptance techniques (e.g. Acceptance and Commitment
Therapy [ACT]; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 2003; Dialectical
Behavior Therapy [DBT]; Linehan, 1993; Mindfulness Based Cogni-
tive Therapy [MBCT]; Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2001), which
encourage clients to adopt an accepting, observing, non-judgmental
relationship to their emotions and other internal phenomena. This
importantly differs from standard cognitive therapy approaches in
that the focus is no longer on changing the content of thoughts,
feelings and beliefs that individuals attach to speciﬁc events, but
instead changing the relationship to this content. Effectively,
acceptance involves relinquishing effortful emotion regulation.
This emphasis on acceptance initially emerged from the inﬂu-
ential thought suppression literature, which demonstrates the
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become almost a clinical truism that intentionally pushing
thoughts out of mind results in a paradoxical increase in their
frequency either at the time of suppression or subsequently (the
‘rebound effect’)(Wegner, 1994; Wegner, Schneider, Carter, &
White, 1987; for reviews see Dalgleish, Hauer, & Kuyken, 2008;
Purdon, 1999; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000; Rassin, 2005).
The suppression of emotions rather than thoughts presents
a slightly different challenge. In the thought domain the goal is to
suppress the object (e.g. a thought about a white bear), whereas in
the emotion domain the goal is to suppress the emotional reaction
to the target (e.g. feelings of sadness) rather than the target itself
(e.g. an unhappy memory). The case has been put forward that
emotion suppression similarly results in a paradoxical rebound, for
example that suppressing the expression of emotion increases
physiological responses to emotional material and impairs social
functioning and memory (e.g. Gross, 1998b, 2007).
Henceforth the idea that suppressing emotions backﬁres shall
be referred to as the ‘maladaptive suppression hypothesis’. By
‘maladaptive’ we mean that the consequences of suppression
jeopardise or impair productive and appropriate functioning for the
individual (cf. Cole, Michel, & Teti, 1994).
The ‘adaptive suppression hypothesis’
On the other hand, a number of theorists increasingly argue
that, for healthy individuals at least, material can in fact sometimes
be suppressed successfully (Erdelyi, 2006). Indeed, the experi-
mental literature on thought suppression actually presents a more
mixed picture than is generally recognised, with thought rebound
failing to be found in some scenarios (e.g. Anderson & Green, 2001;
McLean & Boomﬁeld, 2007, Rassin, 2005). Further, it has been well
demonstrated using directed forgetting, retrieval induced inhibi-
tion or think/no-think paradigms that experimental manipulations
of suppression in healthy populations reduce subsequent memory
of neutral and emotional stimuli (e.g. Anderson & Green, 2001;
Anderson et al., 2004; Barnier et al., 2007; Epstein, 1972; for
reviews see Anderson, 2007; Depue, Curran, & Banich, 2007;
Erdelyi, 2006).
Relevant evidence about the consequences of emotion-, rather
than thought-, suppression can be found in the clinical domain. One
factor that has been associated with resilience in the face of
exposure to extreme adverse events is repressive coping, whereby
individuals avoid unpleasant thoughts, emotions and memories
(Bonanno, 2004). For example, repressors show relatively low
levels of distress and grief for ﬁve years after bereavement
(Bonanno & Field, 2001; Bonanno, Keltner, Holen, & Horowitz,
1995) and demonstrate better adjustment following childhood
sexual abuse, despite being less likely to disclose, relative to non-
repressors (Bonanno, Noll, Putnam, O’Neill, & Trickett, 2003).
Similarly, the ability to suppress emotion expression has been
related to good adjustment following the September 11th terrorist
attacks (Bonanno, Papa, Lalande,Westphal, & Coifman, 2004; Seery,
Cohen Silver, Holman, Ence, & Chu, 2008). This perspective
(henceforth referred to as the ‘adaptive suppression’ hypothesis)
ﬁts well with folk theories of emotion regulation in some cultures,
for example the British notion of ‘keeping a stiff upper lip’.
Perhaps more controversially a case could also be made that
acceptance in some instances might potentially be counter-
productive. Relinquishing effortful emotion regulation and instead
allowing the emotional response to occur could in some extreme
instances expose individuals to overwhelming negative affect that
they cannot simply ‘accept’. This might augment rather than
diminish concurrent and subsequent emotional and cognitive
consequences of the processing of distressing material.As far as we are aware, unhelpful consequences of the use of
acceptance have yet to be empirically demonstrated, however.
There is nevertheless some recent evidence suggesting that
adopting a self-immersed (ﬁrst person, ﬁeld perspective where
emotion experience is recounted and held in awareness), as
opposed to a self-distanced perspective (third person, observer
perspective where emotion experience is reconstrued and rean-
alysed), leads to impaired emotion regulation (e.g. Ayduk & Kross,
2008; Kross & Ayduk, 2009). Arguably, acceptance can be seen as
closer to self-immersion than self-distancing, since it involves a ‘full
and open’ embrace and observation rather than a distanced rean-
alysis of internal phenomena, and might therefore sometimes be
counter-productive as an emotion regulation strategy.
Laboratory investigations of emotion regulation strategies
Given the increasing promotion of acceptance, and rejection of
suppression, especially in clinical practice, it is important that
experimental evidence is generated in the laboratory to examine
these different strategies in both healthy and clinical populations.
In particular, it needs to be established whether the use of emotion
suppression, relative to acceptance, results in increased or
decreased memory for the emotion-eliciting material and a subse-
quent growth or reduction in emotional responsiveness. As well as
being of theoretical interest, such research will provide a better
evidence base for advising clinical populations and/or healthy
individuals frequently exposed to negative emotional stimuli (e.g.
emergency service personnel) about how most effectively to
manage negative emotions. To date, while there has been extensive
laboratory investigation of the consequences of suppression of
cognitive mental material (e.g. thoughts and memories; Anderson
et al., 2004; Dalgleish & Yiend, 2006;Wegner et al., 1987), there has
been surprisingly little well controlled laboratory work on the
consequences of emotion suppression (Campbell-Sills, Barlow,
Brown, & Hofmann, 2006).
The dominant approach has been to compare the consequences
of following instructions to regulate emotions in a variety of ways
when viewing negative emotional stimuli. A series of well
controlled studies by Gross and colleagues have contrasted the
emotional, physiological, mnemonic and social consequences of
reappraisal (construing a potentially emotion-eliciting situation in
a way that reduces its emotional impact) versus suppressing
emotion expression. Partially consistent with the maladaptive
suppression hypothesis, expression suppression, while reducing
the external expression of emotion, did not reduce negative
emotion experience, led to increased physiological responsiveness,
and impaired memory for the emotion-eliciting material. In
contrast, reappraisal subjectively reduced negative emotion expe-
rience (e.g. Gross, 1998a, 1998b; Gross & Levenson, 1993). Similarly,
interacting with individuals who are using expression suppression
is rated as more stressful than interacting with individuals using
reappraisal (Butler et al., 2003).
More complicated to interpret are the mnemonic consequences
of expression suppression. Memory is impaired for material where
expression suppression has been adopted during encoding,
whereas there is no suggestion that reappraisal alters memory
(Richards & Gross, 1999, 2000). Arguably, whether this is seen as
a good or a bad outcome depends on whether the individual wants
to be able to access this material. In some situations (e.g. an
emergency service worker who faces a number of stressful situa-
tions each day) the case can be made that this memory impairment
may actually be advantageous for emotional well-being. This result,
however it is evaluated, is also more consistent with the adaptive
rather than maladaptive suppression hypothesis, since material is
hypo- rather than hyper-accessible following suppression.
1 It is important to acknowledge that these predictions could equally well have
been framed in the reverse direction, based on the maladaptive suppression
hypothesis and beliefs about beneﬁcial effects of acceptance held in the clinical
literature.
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These studies have made an important contribution but
a number of questions remain unanswered. First, the focus on
expression suppression in these experiments may have limited
ecological and clinical validity due to its narrow emphasis. For
many individuals the goal of suppression is not simply to regulate
the external expression of affect but also to exert control over the
internal experience of affect. Indeed, it could be argued that
expression suppression is not really a form of emotion regulation at
all, since it is concerned with displayed rather than experienced
effect and studies generally do not show it has any impact on
emotion experience (e.g. Gross & Levenson, 1993; Gross, 1998b). In
our view, emotion suppression could be more usefully deﬁned in
broader terms, focusing on the down-regulation of both the
external expression and internal experience of emotion. Impor-
tantly, it may be the case that employing this broader type of
emotion suppression has stronger, or even quite different, conse-
quences than expression suppression alone.
As far as we are aware no studies of emotion regulation in
healthy individuals have yet broadened suppression to include the
down-regulation of both externally expressed and internally felt
affect and contrasted this to acceptance. While such an approach
has been adopted in individuals with mood disorders (Campbell-
Sills et al., 2006), this study did not include a no-regulation control
condition. This makes it difﬁcult to interpret if the observed
negative effects of suppression relative to acceptance were due to
suppression being actively unhelpful, acceptance being actively
helpful, or some combination of the two. Moreover, very different
results may emerge in a healthy as opposed to a clinical population.
Second, the downstream emotional consequences of using
suppression and acceptance have not been studied. It remains an
open question as towhether individuals will experience elevated or
reduced emotion responsiveness in the time period after they have
stopped following the emotion regulation instructions. The mal-
adaptive suppression hypothesis would predict that suppression
would result in subsequent elevated emotionality (both back-
ground mood and response to other emotional stimuli), whereas
the adaptive suppression account would argue that suppression
might blunt subsequent emotionality. We do not know of any
studies that have yet examined the crucial downstream mnemonic
and emotional consequences of suppression relative to acceptance.
Third, these studies conﬁned themselves to measuring the
explicit memory effects of suppression. A central feature of reac-
tions to negative events is a simultaneous decrease in explicit
memory and an increase in intrusive thoughts and images about
the events (e.g. Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Dalgleish, 2004).
It is plausible that emotion regulation strategies may also impact on
these intrusive experiences and in ways that differ from their
effects on explicit memory.
Overview of the current study
It therefore remains an open and important question as to
whether emotion suppression can be successfully used by healthy
individuals to down-regulate experience or whether it results in an
unwanted and paradoxical ‘rebound’. To begin to resolve this issue,
the aim of the present study was to contrast the consequences of
suppression and acceptance, relative to a no-regulation control
condition, in healthy individuals. Participants were asked to view
a highly distressing video showing the real-life aftermath of road
trafﬁc accidents (RTAs)(compiled by Steil, 1996) and now, referred
to as the ‘trauma ﬁlm paradigm’ (Holmes & Bourne, 2008; Holmes,
Brewin, & Hennessy, 2004). Suppression instructions asked
participants to down-regulate both their external expression andinternal experience of emotion using a range of strategies because,
as argued previously, we feel that this is the most ecologically valid
deﬁnition of the construct.
The immediate consequences of the emotion regulation strate-
gies were indexed in terms of changes in self-reported emotion
experience and psychophysiological response (heart rate [HR] and
electrodermal activity [EDA]). At the end of viewing the ﬁlm partic-
ipants were told to stop following the particular emotion regulation
instructions. By asking participants to rate their subjective emotion
experience 5min after viewing the video, it was possible tomeasure
immediate mood recovery (cf. Campbell-Sills et al., 2006).
Next, to measure the impact on subsequent emotional respon-
siveness of the different forms of emotion regulation, participants
viewed a series of emotional images and their subjective emotional
responses and psychophysiological reactions to those images were
measured (cf. Dunn, Dalgleish, Lawrence, Cusack, & Ogilvie, 2004).
To examine the cognitive consequences of suppression and
acceptance, at one week follow-up memory for the distressing
video was assessed via questionnaire. Participants also handed in
a diary reporting their experience of intrusions (spontaneously
occurring thoughts or images) about the distressing video
(cf. Holmes et al., 2004). Finally, participants rated their mood for
the week before and the week after viewing the distressing video,
to measure any longer-term impact on mood of the emotion
regulation conditions.Hypotheses
Our global prediction (consistent with the adaptive suppression
hypothesis emerging from the normative literature) was that
suppressionwould in fact be a beneﬁcial form of emotion regulation,
successfully ‘down regulating’ negative affect. In contrast, we antici-
pated that acceptance would lead to potentially unhelpful augmen-
tation of negative affect, based on studies showing the negative
consequences of emotional immersion (e.g. Kross & Ayduk, 2009). In
terms of immediate emotional consequences, we hypothesised that
increasing levels of suppression (suppress> control> accept) would
prompt a decrease in subjective negative emotion experience while
watching the distressing video and a faster recovery of mood in the
5 min after the video ﬁnished (Hypothesis 1). Further, increasing
levels of suppression (suppress > control > accept) would be asso-
ciated with a less marked physiological response when viewing the
distressing video and a faster return to baseline in the 5 min after
viewing (Hypothesis 2). In terms of subsequent emotional conse-
quences, we predicted that increasing levels of suppression would
prompt a lessmarked subsequent increase inemotionality. Therefore,
increasing levels of suppression (suppress> control> accept group)
should be associated with reduced subjective and physiological
emotional response to the affective images (Hypothesis 3) and
a reduced (negative) change in mood for the week following the
experiment (Hypothesis 4). In terms of subsequent mnemomic
consequences, we hypothesised that increasing levels of suppression
(suppress> control> accept)wouldbe linked to a reduced frequency
and lower distress levels of intrusions about the distressing video
content experienced immediately afterwards and in the week
following the experiment (Hypothesis 5). Finally, increasing levels of
suppression (suppress> control> accept) would lead to reduced free
recall and recognition memory of the distressing video at one week
follow-up (cf. Richards & Gross, 1999; Hypothesis 6).1
2 The inﬂuential process model of emotion regulation might see these aspects of
our instructions as reﬂecting ‘reappraisal’, and argue that this is quite distinct from
emotion suppression (e.g. Gross, 1998a). However, in our view the experimental
deﬁnition of ‘reappraisal’ used in the Gross studies (‘‘adopt a detached and
unemotional stance’’; e.g. Gross & Levenson, 1997) is closer to detachment rather
how the concept of reappraisal is utilised in the clinical domain. The essential
feature of reappraisal in therapy is not detaching from but changing the meaning of
a stimulus, for example learning that a panic attack is a sign of anxiety rather than
that a heart attack is imminent. Consistent with this analysis, in a recent reappraisal
training study (Study 3; Schartau et al., 2009) we have shown that using global
reappraisal themes to change the meaning associated with stimuli has different
emotion regulation consequences than simply detaching from the stimuli (based on
the Gross deﬁnition of reappraisal). In the present study we therefore view ‘reap-
praisal’ as deﬁned by the process model as a subtype of emotion suppression, and
distinguish it from clinical reappraisal involving meaning change. To control for the
latter form of reappraisal, which we agree is a distinct form of emotion regulation,
in our manipulation check we asked all volunteers to rate how much effort they
made to change the meanings associated with the video and repeated all analyses
when covarying this out.
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Participants
Eighty nine community volunteers (49 female) were recruited
from the Medical Research Council Cognition and Brain Sciences
Unit (MRC CBSU) volunteer participant panel. Inclusion criteria
included being between 18 and 65 years of age, reporting no clin-
ically signiﬁcant current mental health history in response to
screening questions, having no past history of PTSD (assessed used
the Post-traumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale; Foa, Cashman, Jaycox, &
Perry, 1997), and falling within the normal intelligence range
(assessed using the National Adult Reading Test [NART; Nelson,
1982). Participants were randomly assigned to the emotion
suppression (n¼ 29), emotion acceptance (n¼ 30) or no-regulation
control conditions (n ¼ 30). All participants provided written
informed consent prior to taking part in the study. In particular,
care was taken to ensure that individuals were fully aware of the
potentially distressing nature of the material they would be asked
to view. Participants received an honorarium of £5 (approximately
U.S. $8 or 6 Euros) per hour for their participation in the project. The
study was approved by the local research ethics committee.
Measures
Participants attended a 2 h appointment where they completed
the tasks in the order described below, seated in a comfortable
chair in a darkened room.
Baseline mood measures and rest task
To provide a baseline estimate of state mood, participants rated
howmuch sadness, happiness, fear, disgust and distress (cf. Holmes
et al., 2004) they were experiencing at the current time (rated on
a 100 point pen and paper visual analogue scales, ranging from 0,
not at all, to 100, extremely) and they completed the Spielberger
State Anxiety Scale (STAI state; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene,
Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). To measure baseline longer-term mood,
participants repeated the above happiness, sadness, fear, disgust
and distress scales and completed a further three mood question-
naires probing how they had felt on average in theweek prior to the
experiment. The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward,
Mendelson, & Erbaugh, 1961) was used as a measure of depression
symptoms, the Spielberger Trait Anxiety Scale (trait STAI: Spiel-
berger et al., 1983), with instructions modiﬁed to reﬂect experience
over the past week rather than in general, was used as a measure of
anxiety symptoms, and the Positive And Negative Affect Scale
(PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) was used as a measure of
positive and negative affect. To provide a baseline estimate of
psychophysiological activity, participants were asked to relax for
3 min at the start of the experiment whilst their EDA and HR
activity were recorded.
Distressing video and emotion regulation instructions
Participants watched a 12.5 min digitised video of real-life
footage of the aftermath of ﬁve RTAs (Steil, 1996). Each traumatic
scenewas preceded by a brief commentary that provided context to
the accident and described the people involved. Images in each
scene included emergency service personnel working to extract
trapped victims, injured victims screaming, dead bodies being
moved, and body parts among car wreckage, of an emotional
intensity similar to that seen in television news broadcasts. Previous
studies have used this as an emotion induction and it has been
shown to reliably generate high levels of affect but within accept-
able ethical boundaries (e.g. Holmes & Bourne, 2008; Holmes et al.,
2004; Schartau, Dalgleish, & Dunn, 2009).At the end of the video, participants rated their subjective
emotion experience during viewing (using the same scales as
during the rest period, except that in this instance they were
computer administered). Psychophysiological responses were
indexed in terms of overall mean EDA and HR activity whilst
watching the video (see later psychophysiology method for details
of recording protocol). All participants read the following
instructions:
‘‘You will now view the test ﬁlm. This will show the real life footage
of the aftermath from ﬁve road trafﬁc accidents, which you are likely to
ﬁnd upsetting. It is important for the experiment that you watch the
ﬁlm, but if you become so distressed that you wish to stop the ﬁlm let
the experimenter know by saying ‘stop’ and we will terminate the
experiment. Remember to pay attention to the ﬁlm and do not look
away from the screen, as we will ask you questions about it after-
wards. After the video we will ask you to rate how you are feeling.’’
In addition, participants in the suppress condition were told to
try and suppress their internally felt and externally expressed
emotional responses to the ﬁlm:
‘‘It is very important for the experiment that when you watch the
ﬁlm you try and suppress any emotional responses to it you are having.
What we mean by this is that you should adopt a detached and
unemotional attitude as you watch the ﬁlm. Try to think about what
you are seeing objectively in such a way that you don’t feel anything at
all. Further, if youdo have any feelings try not to let these showand keep
a ’straight face’. In other words, as you watch the ﬁlm, try to behave in
such a way that a person watching you would not know that you were
feeling anything. For example, if the ﬁlm makes you feel afraid, we
would like you to decrease the intensity of fear that you feel and show.’’
These instructions were based on scripts used by Campbell-Sills
et al. (2006) that asked participants to suppress both internal
experience and external expression, but additionally adding the
instruction to detach from their emotional experience.2 In contrast,
participants in the accept condition were told to immerse them-
selves in the ﬁlm and allow themselves to internally experience and
externally express any emotions it produced:
‘‘It is very important for the experiment that when you watch the
ﬁlm you try and accept any emotional responses to it you are having.
Immerse yourself in the ﬁlm, allowing yourself to internally experience
and externally express any emotions it produces. Rather than trying to
control your reaction imagine your emotion is like a cloud passing in
the sky - a natural phenomena that comes and goes regardless of any
attempts you make to inﬂuence it. Let the feelings wash over you, being
aware of how they make you think, feel and react. Just observe all the
different aspects of how you are feeling in response to the ﬁlm, rather
than judging whether the emotion is ’good’ or ’bad’ or ’wanted’ or
’unwanted’. For example, if the ﬁlm makes you feel afraid, allow
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body. If you do ﬁnd yourself beginning to evaluate or control your
emotional reaction that is ﬁne - just notice you have done it and then
gently move your attention back to observing and accepting your
feelings in response to the ﬁlm.’’
These instructions asked participants to accept both the internal
experience and external (bodily) expression of emotion to ensure
they were a mirror image of the suppression instructions and
because conceptual deﬁnitions of acceptance emphasise openness
to thoughts, feelings and bodily sensations.3
Participants in the no-regulation control condition were not
given any emotion regulation instructions.
Participants practiced following the instructions whilst viewing
a short training ﬁlm (an excerpt from ‘A Tale of Two Cities’; a mildly
distressing documentary about the aftermath of the Nagasaki and
Hiroshima bombings) and then viewed the test ﬁlm. When the ﬁlm
was ﬁnished, participants were told they could stop following the
emotion regulation instructions and then rated their mood. Full
instructions and a copy of the narratives accompanying each indi-
vidual scene are available from the corresponding author. The ﬁlm
footage is not in the public domain, due to copyright and conﬁ-
dentiality issues.
Recovery period
Immediately after viewing the ﬁlm, participants completed
a 5 min auditory stream of consciousness ﬁller task (cf. Wegner,
Erber, & Zanakos, 1993) and then again rated their mood (using the
same pen and paper scales as described for the rest task), intended
as a measure of mood recovery (cf. Campbell-Sills et al., 2006). To
index intrusion frequency in the recovery period as a function of
condition, the number of times participants spontaneously
mentioned the content of the distressing video during the SOC task
was also computed.
Compliance measures
To measure self-reported compliance with the emotion regula-
tion instructions during the distressing video, at the end of the
testing session participants were asked to rate the extent to which
they attempted to suppress their emotions, using a visual analogue
scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 100 (extremely)(cf. Schartau
et al., 2009). We expected the suppress group to report increased
suppression efforts and the accept group to report reduced
suppression efforts, relative to the control group. In addition, we
measured the use of other emotion regulation strategies during the
video. Participants rated the extent to which they tried to change
the meaning of the material (a measure of reappraisal) and looked
away from the screen or deliberately thought of others things
(measures of distraction), using visual analogue scales.
It is also possible that habitual tendencies to regulate emotions
may override or interact with Condition in the current experiment,
particularly in the control group who were given no clear emotion
regulation instructions. To examine this possibility participants
completed the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross &
John, 2003), ameasure of the habitual use of expression suppression
and reappraisal. The relationships between ERQ factor scores and
reported efforts to suppress, look away, deliberately think of other
things, or reappraise were then examined in each group separately.3 It is debatable to what extent the instruction to immerse oneself in emotion is
an essential component of acceptance. Conceptual deﬁnitions of acceptance
emphasise the ‘active and aware embrace’ of internal phenomena, which can be
seen as a form of immersion. The degree to which acceptance involves ‘immersing’
(adopting a ﬁeld perspective) versus ‘distancing’ (adopting an observer perspective)
from internal phenomena is in our opinion not currently clear however in the
clinical literature.Affective picture task
To measure the impact of emotion regulation condition on
subsequent processing of emotional material, participants were
shown ﬁfty images predominantly selected from the International
Affective Picture Set (IAPS; Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm,
1993) approximately 5 min after viewing the distressing video (10
positive, 10 neutral, 10 sad, 10 disgusting and 10 neutral). The IAPS
is a series of emotional and neutral images that have detailed
normative ratings and psychophysiological response data (for
a review, see Bradley, 2000). The images are as reported in Dunn
et al. (2004) (all drawn from the IAPS), with the addition of ten
disgusting images drawn from the IAPS and other sources.
Participants viewed each image for 6 s and rated its valence (on
a 9 point sliding visual analogue scale ranging from 1 very
unpleasant to 5 neutral to 9 very pleasant). There was then an 8 s
inter-trial interval before the next image (based on timings used by
Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001). Participants were
instructed to view the pictures as they naturally would andwere not
given any particular emotion regulation strategies. They were then
told to rate how the imagemade them feel as honestly as possible. To
control for order effects, the images were presented in a pseudo-
random sequence. On each block of ﬁve trials, one of each image
type would be randomly selected, presented, and then excluded
from selection on subsequent trials in that block. This ensured that
one exemplar of each image typewas displayed every ﬁve trials. The
task took around 30 min to complete on average.
Electrodermal and HR response to each image were also recor-
ded (see psychophysiology methods). HR response to each image
was indexed by subtracting mean activity in the 1s period prior to
viewing each image from mean activity for the duration of the
picture presentation. EDA response to each index was calculated by
subtracting mean activity in the 1s period prior to viewing each
image from the maximum level of activity that occurred during the
picture viewing period, effectively a measure of peak amplitude.
Median EDA and HR response to each picture type for each
participant were then computed. EDA data were natural log
transformed to correct for a positive skew in the distribution.
Preliminary analyses revealed no interactions between condi-
tion and subjective or physiological responses to the sad, fearful
and disgusting image types, so in the analyses presented below
they are pooled into a composite negative category. Full instruc-
tions and the IAPS number of the images used are available from
the corresponding author.
Intrusions diary
To assess the impact of the emotion regulation conditions on the
experience of intrusions about the video content, participants were
asked to complete a daily intrusion diary for one week after
viewing the video (cf. Brewin & Saunders, 2001; Holmes et al.,
2004; Schartau et al., 2009). Intrusions were deﬁned as spontane-
ously occurring (not deliberate) memories or images of the ﬁlm.
One diary page was provided for each day of the following week,
divided into spaces for morning, afternoon, evening, and night. For
each intrusion experienced, participants were asked to record the
number of times it occurred; whether it was primarily a thought,
image, or both; a brief description of the content; and ﬁnally
a rating of howmuch distress it caused them (ranging from 0 not at
all distressed to 100 extremely distressed). For all times where
participants did not experience any intrusions they were asked to
enter a zero, to make it possible to be certain participants had
completed the diary. The total number of intrusions was counted
from the diary entries by the experimenter. To ensure compliance
with the diary, participants were instructed how to use it at the end
of the ﬁrst testing session and they were a given a cover sheet with
full instructions and a completed example of the diary for one day.
Table 1
Demographic characteristics and compliance with emotion regulation instructions.
Control (n ¼ 30) Suppress (n ¼ 29) Accept (n ¼ 30)
Age 32.80 (16.06) 35.66 (14.98) 37.63 (14.83)
Gender 14 F/16 M 18 F/11 M 17 F/13 M
NART estimated
full scale IQa
117.25 (6.12) 117.58 (7.76) 117.21 (9.25)
PANAS – positive 34.17 (7.35) 33.90 (4.27) 34.17 (6.17)
PANAS – negative 15.60 (2.94) 14.00 (2.80) 15.63 (5.69)
STAI – trait 36.27 (7.15) 35.03 (7.74) 37.20 (11.90)
STAI – state 32.10 (6.43) 31.21 (5.33) 30.04 (8.20)
BDI 3.97 (2.98) 3.21 (2.78) 4.87 (5.10)
Suppressed emotions 36.58 (28.70) 58.04 (31.73) 15.50 (20.00)
Changed meaning 25.65 (24.57) 31.80 (31.80) 13.90 (18.60)
Looked away 4.03 (4.23) 4.99 (7.04) 5.33 (10.25)
Thought of other things 8.25 (8.90) 15.42 (27.61) 4.67 (8.47)
Note – Data are mean (standard deviation) values except where otherwise noted.
NART ¼ National Adult Reading Test; PANAS ¼ Positive Affect Negative Affect Scale;
STAI ¼ Spielberger State Trait Anxiety Inventory; BDI ¼ Beck Depression Inventory.
All compliance ratings on a 100 point scale, ranging from 0 not at all to 100
extremely.
a 1 participants NART data in the suppression group was not available.
B.D. Dunn et al. / Behaviour Research and Therapy 47 (2009) 761–773766At follow-up, participants were asked how often they had been
unable or forgotten to complete the diary on an 11 point scale
(0: not at all true; 10: extremely true; cf. Davies & Clark, 1998).
One week follow up
In a 30 min follow-up appointment one week after the experi-
ment, participants again completed the weekly mood self-report
scales (BDI, PANAS, and modiﬁed trait STAI), making it possible to
look at weekly mood change as a function of the experimental
condition (suppress, accept or no-regulation control). To measure
effects on explicit memory of the Distressing video, participants
also completed a recognition memory questionnaire and a cued
recall explicit memory questionnaire about the ﬁlm (cf. Holmes
et al., 2004). The cued recall questionnaire was made up of 15
questions about speciﬁc details in the ﬁlm (three from each scene)
(e.g. ‘‘What colour was the car that was on ﬁre in a ﬁeld, by a tree, at
the beginning of the ﬁrst scene’’). The recognition memory ques-
tionnaire was made up of 20 descriptions of traumatic scenes and
participants had to judge whether that item had or had not
occurred in the ﬁlm. Half of the items were genuine and half did not
occur in the video (e.g. ‘‘The baby in a blanket is passed to a para-
medic and placed in an ambulance’’). Participants’ intrusion diaries
were also reviewed.
Psychophysiology recording
While participants viewed the distressing video and the affec-
tive images (presented via one computer), their EDA and HR
responses were continuously measured via a BIOPAC MP100
system connected to a separate computer running AcqKnowledge
3.7.2 software (BIOPAC., 1997). To measure EDA response two
grounded Ag–AgCl EDA electrodes (BIOPAC TSD203 transducer)
were secured ventrally on the distal index and middle ﬁnger of the
non-dominant hand. Participants washed their hands with soap
and water prior to electrode attachment and isotonic BIOPAC EDA
paste (with a recommended NaCl concentration of 0.05M; Grey &
Smith, 1984) was used as the electrolyte. The transducer was con-
nected to a BIOPAC GSR100C module, with the gain set to 5V, the
low pass ﬁlter set to 1.0 Hz, and both high pass ﬁlters set to DC. The
EDA signal was transformed into micro-Siemens (mS) units before
being analysed. To measure HR, two disposable Ag–AgCl ECG
electrodes were placed on the dorsal forearms with clip-on shiel-
ded leads attached. Prior to attachment, the electrode sites were
cleaned with alcohol wipes. The electrodes were connected to
a BIOPAC ECG100B module, with the gain set to 5000, the R wave
detector switched off, the ﬁlter switched on, and the high pass ﬁlter
switched off. The ECG waveform was used to estimate HR (in beats
per minute: BPM) using the AcqKnowledge ‘Find Rate’ function. As
the GSR transducer included a ground cable, no additional ground
lead was used for ECG. Data were acquired at 200 samples per
second. Data points more than the three standard deviations from
the mean were excluded as outliers in all cases.
Participants were asked to remove any jewellery or watches and
instructed to move as little as possible during each trial to help
minimise movement artefact. Choice of electrode attachment site
was based on published research guidelines for EDA (Fowles et al.,
1981) and HR (Jennings et al., 1981).
Results
Group comparability
The groups were comparable for age and estimated IQ according
to the National Adult Reading Test (NART; Nelson, 1982), Fs< 1, and
gender ratio, c2 (2, 86) ¼ 1.46, p ¼ .48 (see top of Table 1). Further,
there were no signiﬁcant group differences prior to the experimenton any of the visual analogue ratings of mood, the mood ques-
tionnaires or psychophysiology activity during the rest period,
greatest F ¼ 1.74, smallest p ¼ .18.Instruction compliance
As intended, the three groups signiﬁcantly differed on self-
ratings of suppression effort (see bottom of Table 1), F (2,
86) ¼ 18.02, P < .001 (suppress > control > accept, post hoc LSD
ps < .01). There was also a group difference in reappraisal effort, F
(2, 86) ¼ 3.77, p ¼ .03. The accept group reported reappraising
signiﬁcantly less than the suppress group (p < .01) and tending to
reappraise less than the control group (p ¼ .08), suggesting that, as
intended, the accept group ‘turned off’ the use of reappraisal. There
were no signiﬁcant differences between the suppress and control
groups (p ¼ .36). Participants overall reported not looking away
from the screen or deliberately thinking of other things during the
ﬁlm (mean ratings for each group < 16 on a 100 point scale) and
there were no signiﬁcant group differences on these ratings,
ps > .05, suggesting that the emotion regulation conditions did not
induce signiﬁcantly different degrees of distraction.
Importantly, trait emotion regulation tendencies (measured
using the ERQ) did not appear to substantially inﬂuence instruction
compliance. The only signiﬁcant associations, and these were with
an uncorrected level of alpha, were for trait reappraisal to be
positively correlated with the use of reappraisal during video
viewing (r ¼ .36, p ¼ .05) and for trait expression suppression to be
negatively correlated with the use of thinking of other things
during video viewing (r ¼ .46, p ¼ .01) for individuals in the
suppression group. All other results were non-signiﬁcant (ps> .05).
Further, there were no signiﬁcant associations found in the control
group, suggesting that there is not a clear tendency for individuals
to revert to habitual emotion regulation approaches in the absence
of instruction.Distressing video
Our a priori hypotheses were examined using a series of
repeated measures ANOVAs for each emotion rating/psychophysi-
ology response separately, with Time (rest, ﬁlm, recovery) as the
within-subjects factor and Group (control, suppress, accept) as the
between-subjects factor.
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Indicating that the ﬁlm was a successful emotion induction and
that mood gradually recovered afterwards, there was a signiﬁcant
main effect of Time for all emotions, smallest F ¼ 29.90, ps < .001
(see top half of Table 2). All three time periods signiﬁcantly differed
from one another on all ratings (post hoc LSD ps < .03). Negative
emotions increased from rest to the ﬁlm and then decreased during
recovery. Conversely, happiness ratings decreased from rest to the
distressing video and then increased during recovery.
Our ﬁrst hypothesis was that suppression would lead to
a reduced subjective emotional reaction when viewing the video
and a faster recovery of mood immediately afterwards, whereas
acceptance would lead to an increased subjective emotional reac-
tion during viewing and a slower recovery of mood immediately
afterwards, relative to the control group. Analysis found no signif-
icant main effects of Group for any emotion rating, greatest F¼ 1.20,
smallest p ¼ .31. There was a trend for a signiﬁcant, albeit uncor-
rected, Time by Group interaction for fear ratings, F (4, 172) ¼ 2.18,
p ¼ .07, but not for any other emotion rating, Fs < 1.
To resolve the fear interaction trend, the change from rest to the
ﬁlm, from the ﬁlm to recovery, and from rest to recovery were
analysed separately in three further repeated measures ANOVAs
(cf. Campbell-Sills et al., 2006). For the rest to ﬁlm comparison the
trend for an interaction remained, F (2, 86) ¼ 2.75, p ¼ .07, whereas
for the ﬁlm to recovery comparison, F (2, 86)¼ 2.03, p¼ .14, and the
rest to recovery comparison, F (2, 86)¼ 1.42, p¼ .25, the interaction
was no longer signiﬁcant. The groups were therefore pairwise
compared for the rest to ﬁlm comparison. For the suppress and
control comparison there was a signiﬁcant interaction, F
(1, 57)¼ 5.12, p¼ .03, for the suppress and accept comparison there
was a trend for a signiﬁcant interaction, F (1, 57)¼ 3.33, p¼ .07, and
for the accept and control comparison there was no signiﬁcant
effect, F < 1. This suggests that the suppress group show a smaller
increase in fear when watching the distressing video than the
control group and show a trend in the same direction relative to the
accept group. While there were no signiﬁcant main or interactionTable 2
Subjective emotional ratings and psychophysiological responses during the rest,
ﬁlm, and recovery periods.
control suppress accept
(n ¼ 30) (n ¼ 29) (n ¼ 30)
Happiness Rest 66.33 (18.10) 66.76 (18.39) 67.84 (23.49)
Film 3.84 (9.83) 2.56 (3.18) 2.00 (1.84)
Recovery 23.47 (22.54) 31.34 (25.52) 27.16 (28.31)
Sadness Rest 9.61 (12.75) 8.60 (15.83) 6.60 (10.88)
Film 58.00 (28.19) 50.29 (36.79) 61.77 (29.98)
SOC 39.79 (26.13) 33.85 (31.41) 39.32 (28.84)
Fear Rest 6.25 (7.55) 7.81 (14.67) 5.06 (11.84)
Film 33.35 (25.80) 18.25 (23.93) 30.37 (33.06)
Recovery 18.53 (19.59) 14.01 (16.93) 21.75 (31.36)
Disgust Rest 3.31 (4.48) 1.82 (3.55) 1.81 (2.37)
Film 30.36 (28.66) 23.69 (26.95) 26.47 (33.92)
Recovery 20.39 (20.07) 18.31 (25.63) 18.91 (22.19)
Distress Rest 4.79 (6.82) 2.51 (2.81) 2.96 (5.23)
Film 48.65 (33.99) 41.41 (33.23) 55.07 (35.27)
Recovery 31.51 (27.74) 30.69 (30.96) 35.33 (33.33)
EDA Rest 6.93 (2.70) 6.98 (3.35) 6.57 (1.96)
Film 7.39 (2.97) 7.82 (3.68) 7.41 (2.26)
Recovery 9.09 (3.53) 9.37 (3.77) 8.01 (2.24)
HR Rest 71.42 (9.83) 71.54 (9.85) 71.77 (9.35)
Film 72.04 (9.46) 71.75 (9.24) 71.54 (9.02)
Recovery 80.85 (10.56) 79.27 (16.04) 78.39 (12.91)
Note – Emotions rated on 100 point visual analogue scales, ranging from 0 not at all
to 100 extremely; Electrodermal (EDA) activity recorded in mS (micro-siemens);
heart rate (HR) recorded in beats per minute (BPM).condition effects for the other emotion ratings, it is nevertheless
important to note that numerically the data are in the same
direction as the fear ratings. The suppress group reported less
marked disgust distress, and sadness responses to the ﬁlm, relative
to the other groups.
In summary, only partially supporting Hypothesis 1, suppression
was associated with less marked subjective experience of fear
during video viewing. There were similar, albeit non-signiﬁcant,
patterns for sadness, distress and disgust ratings, relative to the
control condition. There was however no elevation in subjective
emotional experience during viewing in the acceptance group,
relative to the control group, and there were no differences
between any groups in terms of mood recovery immediately after
the video.
Psychophysiology
Our second hypothesis was that suppression would lead to
a reduced psychophysiological response when viewing the video
and a faster return to baseline immediately after viewing, whereas
acceptance would be associated with an elevated physiological
response during viewing and a slower return to baseline immedi-
ately after viewing, relative to the control group. Seven participants’
psychophysiology data (four in the control, two in the suppress, and
one in the accept group) were lost due to equipment failure.
The bottom half of Table 2 shows mean EDA and HR activity
during the rest period, ﬁlm, and recovery period for participants in
the control, suppress, and accept conditions. Three outliers (more
than three SDs from the mean) were excluded from the HR analysis
(two in the suppress group, one in the accept group). Results
revealed a signiﬁcantmain effect of Time, F (2, 75)¼ 22.92, p< .001.
Post hoc LSD tests showed that there was no difference between
rest and ﬁlm (p ¼ .87), that HR increased from ﬁlm to recovery
(p < .001), and that HR increased from rest to recovery (p < .001).
There was no Time by Group interaction and no main effect of
Group, Fs < 1.
One outlier (in the control group) was excluded from the EDA
analysis. Analysis revealed a signiﬁcant effect of Time, F (2,
76) ¼ 34.94, p < .001, with post hoc LSD tests showing that EDA
activity increased from rest to ﬁlm (p < .001) and increased further
from ﬁlm to recovery (p < .001), also meaning that recovery was
signiﬁcantly greater than rest (p < .001). There was no main effect
of Group, F < 1, but there was a trend for a Time by Group inter-
action, F (4,154)¼ 2.17, p¼ .08. To resolve this trend interaction, the
changes from rest to ﬁlm, ﬁlm to recovery, and rest to recovery
were analysed separately. The interactions for change from rest to
ﬁlm, F< 1, or from rest to recovery, F (2, 79)¼ 1.45, p¼ .24, were not
signiﬁcant, but the interaction for change from ﬁlm to recovery
was, F (2, 77) ¼ 3.83, p ¼ .03. Pairwise comparisons showed that
there was no signiﬁcant difference between the control and
suppress groups, F < 1, but that there was a signiﬁcant difference
between the control and accept groups, F (1, 53)¼ 4.77, p¼ .03, and
suppress and accept groups, F (1, 54) ¼ 7.71, p < .01. The accept
group showed a smaller increase in EDA activity from ﬁlm to
recovery than did the other two groups.
In summary, failing to support Hypothesis 2, there was no
difference between the three groups’ physiological responses
during viewing. Also inconsistent with Hypothesis 2, the accept
group relative to the other two groups, showed a less (rather than
more) marked EDA increase in the recovery period, relative to the
other two groups.
Affective picture task
Our third hypothesis was that suppression would lead to a less
marked subsequent increase, and acceptance a more marked
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emotional responsiveness, relative to the control group. Fig. 1
shows subjective valence ratings, EDA response, and HR response
to each picture type for participants in the three groups. Data were
analysed separately for each measure using repeated measures
ANOVA, with Picture Type (happiness, sadness, fear, disgust,
neutral) as the within-subjects factor and Group (control, suppress,
and accept) as the between-subjects factor.
Self-report
Valence ratings analysis revealed no signiﬁcant main effect of
Group, F < 1, but a signiﬁcant main effect of Picture Type, F (4,
344) ¼ 607.66, p < .001. Post hoc LSD tests revealed that positive
pictures were rated more positively than all other image types
(ps < .001), neutral images were rated more positively than all of
the negative image types (ps < .001), fear and sad images did not
signiﬁcantly differ to one another (p ¼ .19), and disgust images
were rated more negatively than all other image types (ps < .001).
There was also a signiﬁcant Picture Type by Group interaction, F (8,
344) ¼ 2.60, p ¼ .01.
To resolve this interaction, a series of univariate ANOVAS was
run for each image type separately. There was a signiﬁcant group
effect for positive images, F (2, 86)¼ 4.64, p¼ .01, with post hoc LSD
tests showing that the suppress group reported lower (less
pleasant) ratings than the accept group (p < .01), the suppress
group tended to report lower ratings than the control group
(p < .10), and that the control group showed non-signiﬁcantly
lower ratings than the accept group (p¼ .17). Therewas also a trend
for a group effect for neutral images, F (2, 86) ¼ 2.58, p ¼ .08. Post
hoc LSD tests showed that the suppress group reported lower (less
pleasant) valence ratings than the accept group (p ¼ .03) but that
the other groups were not signiﬁcantly different (smallest p ¼ .26).
There were no signiﬁcant group difference for disgust, F (2,
86) ¼ 1.78, p ¼ .18, sadness or fear, Fs < 1, images.
Psychophysiology
Two participants’ psychophysiology data were missing due to
equipment failure, leaving 29 participants in each group for the
EDA analysis. Analysis found amain effect of Group, F (2, 84)¼ 3.87,
p ¼ .03, with the accept group showing a greater overall EDA
response than the other groups (ps < .05), but the suppress and
control groups not signiﬁcantly differing (p ¼ .56). There was also
a signiﬁcant effect of Picture Type, F (4, 81) ¼ 4.15, p < .01, but no
Picture Type by Group interaction, F< 1. Post hoc tests showed that
the fear images showed a greater EDA response than positive, sad
and disgusting images (ps < .01) and a near-signiﬁcant greater
response than neutral images (p ¼ .07). Neutral images showed
a greater response than sad images (p ¼ .03) and a near-signiﬁcant
greater response than positive images (p < .07). No other
comparisons were signiﬁcant (ps > .10).
A further ﬁve participants were excluded from the HR analysis
as outliers (more than three standard deviations from the mean).
This left a ﬁnal sample size of 25 in the control group, 28 in the
suppress group, and 28 in the accept group for HR analysis. Overall,
participants showed an HR deceleration when viewing the images,
consistent with an initial orienting response (Bradley, 2000).
Results showed a main effect of Group, F (2, 78) ¼ 6.78, p ¼ .002.
The accept group showed a greater HR deceleration across all image
types than the control and suppress groups (post hoc LSD
ps < .005), whereas the suppress and control groups did not
signiﬁcantly differ (post hoc LSD p ¼ .70). There was also a signiﬁ-
cant effect of Picture Type, F (4, 75) ¼ 8.87, p < .001. The positive
and neutral images produced a less marked HR deceleration than
sad and disgusting images (ps < .01) and tended to produce a less
marked HR deceleration than fear images (p < .07). Fear imagesproduced a less marked HR deceleration than sad images (p < .01)
and tended to produce a less marked HR deceleration than
disgusting images (p ¼ .06). Sad and disgusting images did not
signiﬁcantly differ (p ¼ .11) and neither did neutral and positive
images (p ¼ .92). There was no signiﬁcant Picture Type by Group
interaction, F (8, 152) ¼ 1.90, p ¼ .07.
In summary, partially consistent with Hypothesis 3, increasing
levels of suppression (suppress > control > accept) led to reduced
self-reported emotional response to positive but not negative
stimuli. Similarly, acceptance led to elevated EDA and HR reactivity
to subsequently presented emotional material. There were
however no differences between the suppress and control groups.
Mood change
Our fourth hypothesis was that suppression would lead to a less
marked increase, whereas acceptancewould lead to amoremarked
increase, in negative mood in the week following the experiment,
relative to the control group. Scores on themood questionnaires for
the week before were subtracted from scores on the questionnaires
for the week after the experiment to generate a change score (see
Table 3). Due to a combination of experimenter error (7 participants
were not given the mood scales at time one to complete) and four
participants not attending the follow-up session, the ﬁnal sample
size consisted of 25 in the control group, 23 in the suppress group
and 30 in the accept group.
There were no signiﬁcant group differences for modiﬁed trait
anxiety, F (2, 75) ¼ 1.64, p ¼ .20, modiﬁed PANAS positive affect,
F < 1, or BDI, F < 1. There was however a signiﬁcant group differ-
ence on modiﬁed PANAS negative affect, F (2, 75) ¼ 4.54, p ¼ .01.
The accept group displayed an increase in negative affect in the
week after the experiment and this signiﬁcantly differed from the
decrease shown by the control group (post hoc LSD p < .01) and
non-signiﬁcantly differed from the decrease shown by the suppress
group (post hoc LSD p ¼ .12). There was no signiﬁcant difference
between the control and suppress group (post hoc LSD p ¼ .12).
Therefore, only partly supporting predictions, acceptance leads to
elevated negative affect, but only on some measures, and there
were no signiﬁcant differences between the suppress and control
groups.
Intrusions
Our ﬁfth hypothesis was that suppression would lead to
reduced, whereas acceptance would lead to increased, intrusion
frequency and distress, relative to the control condition. A number
of participants SOC data were lost from the recovery phase due to
recording equipment failure, leaving 27 participants in the control
group, 24 in the suppress group, and 29 in the accept group. Failing
to support predictions, there were no signiﬁcant group difference
in total intrusions during the recovery period, F (2, 77) ¼ 1.85,
p¼ .17 (see Table 4). Of those participants who completed the diary
and attended the follow-up appointment (29 in the control group,
30 in the accept group and 26 in the suppress group), self-reported
instruction compliance was generally adequate (mean ¼ 2.24;
SD ¼ 1.95; ratings made on an 11 point scale ranging from 0 good
compliance to 10 poor compliance) and there was no difference
between groups in how well they reported following the instruc-
tions, F < 1. Again inconsistent with predictions, there were no
group differences in diary intrusion frequency, F(1, 82) ¼ 2.15,
p ¼ .12, or distress, F < 1.
Weakly supporting Hypothesis 5 however, a post hoc analysis
found a signiﬁcant difference in the proportion of participants in
each group reporting zero intrusions, c2 ¼ 13.13, p < .01. The
suppress group had a signiﬁcantly greater proportion of
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Fig. 1. Valence ratings and psychophysiology response to IAPS images. a) Valence Ratings, b) EDAResponses, c) HRResponses. Note–Data aremean (standard error of themean) values.
Table 3
Change in mood in week following experiment.
Control (n ¼ 25) Suppress (n ¼ 23) Accept (n ¼ 30)
BDI .52 (2.72) .13 (2.20) .33 (3.89)
STAI – trait (modiﬁed) 1.96 (4.89) 1.27 (3.75) .39 (5.78)
PANAS – positive (modiﬁed) .96 (8.45) 1.30 (6.01) .53 (7.04)
PANAS – negative (modiﬁed) 3.08 (5.61) 1.21 (3.19) .30 (3.26)
Note – Data are mean (standard deviation) values.
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Fig. 2. Recognition and recall memory of ﬁlm content at one week follow-up. Note –
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c2¼ 6.58, p¼ .01, and accept group, c2¼ 9.29, p< .01, but therewas
no difference between the control and accept group, c2 < 1.
Memory tests
Our ﬁnal hypothesis was that suppression would lead to
reduced, whereas acceptance would lead to increased, free recall
and recognition memory of the distressing video, relative to the
control condition. Of the participants who attended the second
testing session (28 in the control, 27 in the suppress and 30 in the
accept group), there was no signiﬁcant group difference for
recognition memory of the ﬁlm content, F < 1, but there was
a signiﬁcant group effect for free recall of the ﬁlm content, F (2,
82) ¼ 4.89, p ¼ .01 (see Fig. 2). Partially consistent with Hypothesis
6, the suppress group had signiﬁcantly reduced free recall memory
relative to both the control (post hoc LSD p ¼ .04) and accept (post
hoc LSD p < .01) groups, but there was however no difference
between the control and accept groups (post hoc LSD p ¼ .33).
Controlling for trait emotion regulation approaches
and the use of reappraisal
Additional analyses were conducted to control for the possibility
that trait emotion regulation tendencies could impact on partici-
pants’ adherence to the experimental instructions and that the
conditions were confounded by differential reappraisal effort. All
experimental analyses were additionally repeated when entering
ERQ reappraisal and expression suppression or reappraisal effort
ratings as covariates. In all cases an identical pattern of ﬁndings
emerged for the key analyses on the main and interaction effects of
group in both cases, suggesting that trait emotion regulation
tendencies and reappraisal effort are not confounding the current
results.
Discussion
The present study investigated the immediate and longer-term
emotional and mnemonic consequences of asking healthy partici-
pants to follow suppression versus acceptance emotion regulation
instructions while viewing a distressing video, relative to a no
instruction control condition. We contrasted predictions emerging
from the third wave cognitive therapy literature that emotion
suppression might lead to a ‘rebound’ analogous to that seenTable 4
Intrusions data during recovery period and for week following experiment.
Control (n ¼ 29) Suppress (n ¼ 26) Accept (n ¼ 30)
Recovery intrusion number 2.22 (.39) 1.58 (1.74) 1.38 (1.29)
Diary compliance 2.36 (1.42) 2.85 (2.84) 2.20 (1.38)
Diary intrusion number 8.17 (10.90) 4.50 (4.81) 5.03 (3.44)
Diary proportion reporting
zero intrusions
.07 .35 .03
Diary intrusion distressa 24.33 (20.37) 21.24 (19.04) 23.74 (20.61)
Note – Data are mean (standard deviation) values, except where otherwise stated.
a Calculated only for those participants who reported intrusions (n¼ 27 in control
group; n ¼ 17 in suppress group; n ¼ 28 in accept group).following thought suppression (‘maladaptive suppression’; e.g.
Hayes et al., 2004) with predictions generated from the normative
retrieval inhibition and directed forgetting literatures that emotion
suppressionmight sometimes successfully lead to down-regulation
of subsequent responses (‘adaptive suppression’; e.g. Anderson,
2007; Dalgleish et al., 2008). We hypothesised that healthy
participants would be able to suppress their emotions and that this
would be associated with subsequent, potentially helpful, down-
regulation. In contrast, we hypothesised that acceptance would be
associated with subsequent, potentially unhelpful, augmentation of
response in healthy individuals.Overview of ﬁndings
In terms of immediate emotional consequences, consistent with
Hypothesis 1, suppression reduced the self-reported subjective
experience of fear while viewing the distressing video, relative to
the other conditions, although this was a small effect. Sadness,
disgust and distress ratings were also non-signiﬁcantly lower
following suppression. There were however no differences
between the acceptance and control groups and no group effects in
subjective mood recovery in the 5 min period after viewing the
video.
Failing to support Hypothesis 2, there were no differences
between groups in EDA or HR responses while watching the video.
All groups showed a signiﬁcant increase in EDA from viewing to
recovery, but contrary to predictions this increase was less marked
in the accept group and there were no differences between the
suppress and control groups. This suggests that healthy individuals
can to some extent successfully suppress their subjective emotional
experience, but less so psychophysiological responses. At face
value, these psychophysiological ﬁndings contrast with previous
ﬁndings of increased psychophysiological response following
expression suppression, relative to reappraisal (Gross, 1998b; Gross
et al., 1993). The Gross studies however do not include a neutral
control condition and it may be the case that reappraisal lowers
psychophysiological response, rather than suppression elevating it.
Moreover, there may be different consequences associated with
suppression of expression alone versus suppression of both felt and
expressed affect.
In terms of subsequent emotional consequences once the
emotion regulation instructions were relinquished, as predicted in
Hypothesis 3, acceptance was associated with increased EDA and
HR reactivity to subsequently presented emotional (both positive
B.D. Dunn et al. / Behaviour Research and Therapy 47 (2009) 761–773 771and negative) images, relative to both the control and suppress
groups. Only partially consistent with predictions, suppression was
associated with reduced self-reported valence ratings to positive
and neutral, but not negative, images and there were no differences
in the psychophysiology responses to the IAPS images between the
suppress and control groups. Similarly, partially supporting
Hypothesis 4, the accept group reported more negative affect than
both the suppress and control groups. However, there were no
signiﬁcant differences between the control and suppress groups
and no signiﬁcant group differences for BDI, PANAS positive affect,
or modiﬁed trait anxiety. While one might inevitably expect that
acceptance should lead to increased emotionality at the time of
encoding, that elevations in (predominantly negative) affect persist
long after acceptance has been relinquished raise question marks
about how adaptive a form of emotion regulation it is.
In terms of subsequent mnemonic consequences, while there
were no differences between groups in the mean number of
intrusions reported about the ﬁlm, partially consistent with
Hypothesis 5 there were a signiﬁcantly greater proportion of
participants in the suppress group who reported zero intrusions.
There were no group differences in the mean distress associated
with each intrusion. Partially validating our sixth hypothesis, the
suppress group showed reduced free recall (but not recognition)
memory of the distressing video at one week follow-up, relative to
the other conditions.
This demonstrates that previous ﬁndings of reduced memory
following suppression in healthy individuals (Richards & Gross,
1999, 2000) can be replicated when adopting a broader deﬁnition
of suppression that looks at inhibition of both externally expressed
and internally experienced affect. We extend these earlier ﬁndings
by showing that suppression, while not altering overall intrusion
frequency, does make it more likely that individuals will experience
no intrusions whatsoever. Again, our results are consistent with
effective down-regulation following emotion suppression.
Whether or not the impaired free recall and reduced experience of
intrusions found in the suppression group is seen as a strength or
a weakness is a question of perspective. In some instances, for
example emergency services workers frequently exposed to trau-
matic circumstances that they do not wish to overly intrude into
their personal lives, reduced recall of the situations (but with no
associated elevation of intrusive phenomena) may be beneﬁcial.
Overall, counter to heuristic beliefs promoting acceptance and
discouraging emotion suppression in the clinical literature (e.g ACT;
Hayes et al., 2004; DBT; Linehan, 1993; MBCT; Segal et al., 2001),
these results generally found no clear ‘rebound’ consequences of
emotion suppression within a healthy population. In contrast to
ﬁndings in the thought suppression literature (e.g. Purdon, 1999;
Wegner et al., 1987), no increase in negative affect was observed
following emotion suppression. On the contrary, where there were
signiﬁcant group differences, these were suggestive of successful
suppression and carry over suppression effects, even when partic-
ipants report relinquishing the strategy, on both mood and
memory. Similarly, while other analyses were non-signiﬁcant, data
generally went in the direction of successful suppression. This
successful down-regulation of emotion experience does however
carry with it potential costs, in that the suppress group reported
reduced positive emotion experience on the IAPS task. Future
research is warranted to examine whether this could relate to the
anhedonic symptoms found in depression and related conditions
(cf. Kashdan & Steger, 2006).
Theoretical and clinical implications
These ﬁndings have a number of interesting theoretical and
clinical implications. Most importantly, they strengthen the claimsemerging from the retrieval inhibition and directed forgetting
literatures that suppression can be effectively applied in some
circumstances (Anderson, 2007), replicating these ﬁndings in
a more ecologically valid setting.
Clinically, these results suggest that a more nuanced view of the
beneﬁts of suppression versus acceptance may need to be adopted
in therapy. Rather than globally discouraging the use of suppres-
sion, it may be helpful to carry out a cost-beneﬁts analysis with
each individual client for each speciﬁc situation and set up
behavioural experiments (Bennett-Levy et al., 2004) to examine the
consequences of emotion suppression. Similarly, the present results
suggest that emotion suppression need not necessarily be
discouraged in healthy individuals frequently exposed to trauma,
such as emergency service workers (see also Mitmansgruber, Beck,
& Schu¨ßler, 2008). Building on previous ﬁndings questioning the
validity of debrieﬁng interventions (e.g. Tuckey, 2007), our results
indicate that it may not be necessary to ‘emote’ to adequately
process distressing material. Moreover, acceptance under some
circumstances may be counter-productive, leading to a subsequent
augmentation of negative affect. These data are consistent with
repressive coping being associated with resilience following
exposure to extreme adverse events (e.g. Bonanno, 2004).
Further, these ﬁndings suggest that individuals may choose to
adopt particular forms of emotion regulation partly because of the
longer-term mood and memory consequences. For example,
emotion suppressionmaybeadoptedbecause it reduces subsequent
memory of distressing material. We recommend that future
emotion regulation studies also include immediate and longer-term
emotional and mnemonic measures to make it possible to pick up
the subtleties involved with different forms of emotion regulation.
Future directions
An important next step will be to examine the boundaries of
adaptive/effective suppression. It is entirely plausible that emotion
suppression, while potentially beneﬁcial in healthy individuals,
could become pathological or counter-productive in clinical groups.
Indeed, individuals may continue to use emotion suppression even
if it maintains and exacerbates their clinical condition because they
have experienced it as helpful when well. For example, an inter-
esting future study will be to contrast the consequences of emotion
suppression in the same depressed individuals when they are in
episode and recovered to test this possibility. Similarly, habitual
preferences for particular kinds of emotion regulation may interact
with the success of the kind of state manipulations used in the
present study. For example, individuals with high versus low levels
of experiential avoidance may show different consequences when
using suppression (cf. Feldner, Zvolensky, Eifert, & Spira, 2003).
Future work could also systematically explore the behavioural
consequences of suppression and acceptance (e.g. willingness or
length of time spent engaging with other emotional material),
given that a primary goal of acceptance based clinical interventions
is to reduce behavioural avoidance. It may also prove fruitful to
develop more systematic ways of training participants in emotion
regulation strategies (cf. Schartau et al., 2009). In the present study
we gave participants the aim of themanipulation (e.g. to reduce the
emotions you feel and show), without giving speciﬁc directions
about how to achieve this. It is possible that even stronger conse-
quences of acceptance versus suppression may emerge following
training.
Limitations
There are a number of potential limitations with the present
study. First, we adopted a broad deﬁnition of emotion suppression,
B.D. Dunn et al. / Behaviour Research and Therapy 47 (2009) 761–773772asking individuals to down-regulate their emotion experience and
expression by whatever means, potentially including detachment,
expression suppression and other strategies. Similarly, the global
deﬁnition of acceptance that we adopted included elements of
immersion, openness to experience, and non-judgmental obser-
vation. While we feel that these broader conceptualisations of
emotion suppression and acceptance have greater ecological val-
idity and link well with clinical approaches to emotion regulation,
we acknowledge that these deﬁnitions depart from aspects of the
existing experimental literature in some ways. For example, the
process model of emotion regulation (e.g. Gross, 2007) might view
the detachment component of our suppression instructions as
a form of reappraisal, and as quite distinct from emotion suppres-
sion. Similarly, the acceptance clinical literature is not fully explicit
about the extent to which acceptance involves taking a self-
detached versus self-immersed relationship to internal phenomena
(cf. Kross & Ayduk, 2009). It remains possible that different aspects
of emotion suppression and acceptance as globally deﬁned here, for
example internal versus expression suppression or self-immersion
versus self-detachment, have quite different consequences that we
are unable to tease apart in the present study.
Second, asking participants to view a ﬁlm involving real-life
footage of the aftermath of road trafﬁc accidents, while having
greater ecological validity than some previously used methodolo-
gies, is still different from studying naturalistic, personally experi-
enced negative events. There are however ethical issues about
exposing participants to more naturalistic stressors and it is difﬁ-
cult to exert tight experimental control in these scenarios.
Third, aspects of the sample recruited may limit generalisability
of these ﬁndings. Participants were predominantly white middle
class and there were more women and men. There is good
preliminary evidence that there are cultural (e.g. Butler, Lee, &
Gross, 2007) and gender (Garnefski, Teerds, Kraaij, Legerstee, &
vandenKommer, 2004) differences in the acceptability and efﬁcacy
of different emotion regulation strategies.
Fourth, it is possible that the results observed in the present
study are demand effects, whereby participants rated their mood
and memory changed because this is how they felt they were
supposed to respond. We feel this is unlikely, however given that
care was taken not to suggest to participants that acceptance or
suppression would be particularly helpful or unhelpful. Finally, the
different experimental instructions were not matched for word
length (acceptance > suppression > control), although we feel it is
unlikely that this has inﬂuenced results.
Concluding remarks
In summary, the present study adds to the existing normative
literature on emotion regulation by showing that the longer-term
consequences of emotion suppression are an ongoing dampening
of reactivity (reduced emotional response to positive material,
reduced memory of the material encoded, and greater likelihood of
experiencing no intrusions about the memory encoded). This goes
against the predictions of the thought suppression literature, which
might suggest there would be a ‘rebound’ following emotion
suppression analogous to that often seen following the suppression
of thoughts (e.g. Wegner, 1994). In contrast, the longer-term effects
of acceptance are better characterised by an elevation in reactivity
(more negative affect at one week follow-up, greater physiological
response to emotional images). Overall, these results are somewhat
contrary to the current clinical zeitgeist (e.g. Hayes et al., 2003) and
suggest that it is helpful to take a more nuanced view of the costs
and beneﬁts of different forms of emotion regulation. Depending
on the goals of the individual, it may be that they prefer to use
suppression or acceptance in a particular scenario. In lay terms,a small dose of ‘stiff upper lip’ may at times help individuals
adaptively cope with aversive situations.
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